Why are communitarian views sometimes criticized as forms of ethical relativism?

Communitarianism is sometimes criticized as a form of ethical relativism because it prioritizes communal formulations of the "good," which are inherently specific to individual cultures, societies, or communities. By arguing that moral values are embedded within particular social contexts rather than derived from universal, abstract principles, communitarians face the charge that they deny the existence of an absolute good, suggesting instead that there are only different goods for different groups.1

Critics argue that this position is untenable because it could theoretically validate practices that violate fundamental human rights, such as lynching, honor killings, or other oppressive acts, if those practices are deemed "good" by the standards of a specific community. This raises the ethical concern that communities should not be the ultimate arbiters of morality. In response, some communitarians, such as Charles Taylor, have argued that despite differing ultimate values, an "overlapping consensus" on specific norms is possible, and some scholars suggest that universal values like human rights can serve as a necessary foundation for communal ones.1