What is the difference between reductive materialism and eliminative materialism?

In the philosophy of mind, reductive materialism and eliminative materialism offer fundamentally different accounts of mental phenomena.

Reductive Materialism

Also known as the identity theory, reductive materialism posits that mental states—such as thoughts, sensations, and beliefs—are real, but they are identical to physical states of the brain. Proponents argue that mental events are simply physical events; for example, a specific sensation of pain might be identified as a particular complex interaction of atoms or the firing of C-fibres in the brain. This view seeks to unify mental and physical causal claims by asserting that the mental is "nothing but" the physical.123

Eliminative Materialism

In contrast, eliminative materialism argues that mental states as described by "folk psychology"—such as beliefs, desires, and intentions—do not exist at all. Rather than attempting to reduce these concepts to neural activity, eliminative materialists contend that our common-sense mentalistic vocabulary is fundamentally flawed and should be discarded, much like the discarded scientific notion of phlogiston. They maintain that a complete account of human experience can be achieved entirely through a scientific description of brain operations and behavior.124