What is agent-causation in Roderick Chisholm's theory of free will?

In Roderick Chisholm’s theory, agent-causation is the proposal that free actions are caused directly by the agents themselves rather than by prior events, states of affairs, or external circumstances.1

Introduced in his 1964 paper "Human Freedom and the Self," this concept serves as a libertarian account of free will, aiming to ground moral responsibility in the agent as the ultimate origin of their actions. Chisholm posits that agent-causation is a primitive, unanalyzable notion, meaning it cannot be reduced to more basic causal mechanisms.1

While this theory seeks to preserve the intuition that individuals are the true authors of their choices, it has faced significant criticism. Many philosophers argue that by treating agent-causation as a "primitive" concept, the theory fails to provide a substantive explanation of how freedom is possible, effectively leaving a "blank space" where a detailed mechanism should be. Consequently, it remains a controversial attempt to reconcile human agency with the causal order of the universe.12