What does it mean for a scientific theory to be empirically adequate?
In the philosophy of science, a scientific theory is considered empirically adequate if it successfully captures or predicts the observable phenomena of the world.1
This concept is central to the doctrine of constructive empiricism, developed by the philosopher Bas van Fraassen. According to this view, the primary aim of science is not necessarily to produce theories that are literally true in their descriptions of unobservable entities or underlying realities, but rather to construct theories that are empirically adequate.1
A theory meets this standard if everything it says about observable matters—the "phenomena"—is true. In practice, this means the theory must be consistent with, and facilitate the correct prediction of, observable facts recorded through observation or experimentation. While scientific realists argue that the success of such theories is best explained by their truth, proponents of empirical adequacy maintain that a theory's inferential reliability regarding observable events is the essential criterion for scientific acceptance.1