How were economic sanctions supposed to stop aggression under the League of Nations?

Under the League of Nations, economic sanctions were designed as the primary coercive mechanism to uphold collective security and deter aggression. According to Article 16 of the Covenant, members committed to joining in common action against any state that resorted to war in violation of the organization's principles.1

The logic behind this approach was that the threat of a comprehensive economic boycott would be severe enough to compel aggressive governments to choose negotiation over armed conflict. By cutting off trade, financial credit, and the export of raw materials or arms, the League intended to impose significant costs on the aggressor, thereby forcing a retreat or preventing the escalation of hostilities.12

However, the effectiveness of these sanctions was fundamentally undermined by the absence of the United States from the League, which deprived the system of its most potent economic threat. Furthermore, the practical application of sanctions—such as those imposed on Italy during its 1935 invasion of Ethiopia—often failed due to inconsistent enforcement and the prioritization of other political goals by major powers.132