How does truth-conditional semantics explain the meaning of a sentence?

In the philosophy of language, truth-conditional semantics posits that to understand the meaning of a sentence is to know the conditions under which that sentence would be true.1

This approach, notably developed by Donald Davidson, draws upon the work of Alfred Tarski. Davidson proposed that a semantic theory for a natural language is adequate if it can generate statements of the form: "‘S’ is true just in case p," where S is a sentence in the object language and p describes the circumstances in which that sentence is true. For example, the meaning of the sentence "snow is white" is explained by the condition that it is true if and only if snow is white.1

While this framework provides a logical basis for meaning, it faces challenges regarding sentences that share truth conditions but differ in meaning, such as those involving different descriptions of the same individual. To address this, some theorists incorporate the "principle of charity" or distinguish between the "character" of an expression and its specific truth conditions in a given context.1