How does the success of scientific theories support arguments for scientific realism?

In the philosophy of science, the argument that the success of scientific theories supports scientific realism is often called the "ultimate argument for realism."1

Realists contend that the systematic success of scientific theories—such as the ability to compute reaction energies with extreme accuracy or manufacture organisms with precise traits—would be a "coincidence of cosmic proportions" or a "miracle" if those theories were not at least approximately true. From this perspective, the most credible explanation for why the world behaves as if our best theories are true is that those theories are, in fact, true descriptions of reality, including the unobservable entities they postulate.12

However, this argument faces significant challenges from antirealists:

• Pessimistic Induction: Critics like Larry Laudan argue that history is full of once-successful theories (such as the phlogiston theory) that are now considered false and whose theoretical terms refer to nothing.34
• Explanatory Power: Antirealists argue that realists beg the question by assuming that explanatory power is a reliable indicator of truth. They suggest that science aims for "empirical adequacy"—the ability to predict observable phenomena—rather than literal truth.42

In response, many contemporary philosophers have adopted a "piecemeal realism," which focuses on the approximate truth of specific theoretical claims rather than the theory as a whole.3