How does the semantic conception describe scientific theories as models?

In the philosophy of science, the semantic conception—originally formulated by Patrick Suppes—shifts the focus of scientific theories away from linguistic or axiomatic structures. Instead, it describes theories as collections of models accompanied by hypotheses regarding how these models relate to specific parts of nature.1

Under this view, models are characterized in two primary ways:
* Abstract structures: Some versions define models as abstract mathematical structures that allow for precise formal specifications.1
* Concrete representations: Other versions view models as more concrete entities, such as the physical models of molecules used by chemists.1

A key advantage of this approach is its ability to account for the practice of idealization. Rather than requiring theories to provide literally correct descriptions of the world, the semantic conception suggests that scientists propose models and claim that specific aspects of nature correspond to those models to certain degrees. This framework is particularly useful for scientific fields that resist simple axiomatization, such as Darwinian evolutionary theory, and it avoids issues related to language-dependent interpretations.1