How does ethical relativism differ from moral skepticism?

Ethical relativism and moral skepticism are distinct philosophical positions regarding the nature and status of moral claims.

Ethical relativism is the doctrine that there are no absolute or objective moral truths. Instead, it posits that what is considered morally right or wrong is relative to individual preferences or the social standards of a particular culture. Under this view, moral judgments are not "true" or "false" in an objective sense; rather, they are valid only within the context of the specific social code or personal sentiment from which they arise.1

Moral skepticism, by contrast, is a broader category of thought that questions the possibility of moral knowledge. While a relativist asserts that morality exists but is relative, a moral skeptic may doubt whether any moral claims can be known with certainty or whether a realm of objective moral facts exists at all. Some skeptics, such as those who hold an "error theory," may even deny the existence of moral properties entirely, arguing that moral discourse is fundamentally mistaken in its attempt to describe objective reality.23

In short, while relativism provides a specific account of how morality functions (as a social or personal construct), skepticism focuses on the fundamental doubt regarding our ability to access or verify moral truth.132