How does central-state materialism connect mental processes to the brain?

Central-state materialism connects mental processes to the brain by identifying mental states, events, and processes with physical states, events, and processes occurring within the brain or central nervous system.123

This connection is primarily established through two main approaches:

• Translation Form: This view suggests that mentalistic discourse can be translated into physical terms. For example, American philosopher David K. Lewis argued that because mental entities like pain are defined in commonsense psychology by their causal roles in relation to behavior, and because these same roles are empirically ascribed to brain processes, mental events are identical to those brain processes.1
• Identity Theory: This theory posits that mental states are identical to physical states of the brain, similar to how lightning is identical to an electrical discharge. While early "type-identity" theories faced criticism for implying that only humans could have mental states, many philosophers shifted to "token-identity" theories, which argue that each specific occurrence of a mental state is identical to a specific physical state of the brain.42

These theories aim to unify causal claims, asserting that mental events influence physical behavior because they are, in fact, physical events themselves.4