How does Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism differ from scientific realism?
The primary difference between scientific realism and Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism lies in their respective goals for scientific theories and their ontological commitments regarding unobservable entities.12
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Scientific Realism: Realists argue that science aims for a literally true account of the world. They maintain that accepting a scientific theory involves committing to the truth of its claims, including those regarding unobservable entities (such as electrons or subatomic particles) that underlie observable phenomena. Realists often contend that this commitment is necessary to explain the success of science.132
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Constructive Empiricism: Van Fraassen’s position holds that the aim of science is not truth, but "empirical adequacy". A theory is empirically adequate if it correctly predicts and captures observable phenomena. According to this view, scientists build models to "save the phenomena," but one need not believe that the unobservable entities described in those models actually exist. Instead, one should remain agnostic about unobservables, as there is no need to assume the extra risks of ontological commitment when the theory’s success can be explained by its empirical adequacy alone.12