How do words, paintings, and gestures gain derived intentionality from human minds?

In the philosophy of mind, mental states such as beliefs, thoughts, and perceptions possess "intrinsic" or "original" intentionality—the inherent capacity to be about or directed toward something.123

In contrast, products of the mind—such as words, paintings, and gestures—possess "derived" intentionality. This content is not inherent to the objects themselves but is acquired from the minds of their creators or users.1

According to the philosopher John Searle, speech acts and linguistic expressions gain this derived intentionality because they are expressive of intrinsically intentional mental states. Essentially, these external symbols function as vehicles for the propositional contents and psychological states already present in human consciousness. Through the use of "we-intentions" and social conventions, individuals collectively agree to treat certain objects or utterances as representing specific meanings, effectively creating a shared social reality where symbols count as something else within a given context. Thus, while a stone or a star does not represent anything, human minds imbue artifacts with meaning by projecting their own intentional content onto them.241