How do scientific realists describe the goal of scientific theories?

Scientific realists maintain that the primary goal of scientific theories is to provide a literally true account of the world, including aspects that may not be directly observable.1

While both realists and antirealists agree that theories should facilitate the prediction of observable phenomena—often described as "saving the phenomena"—realists argue that science aims for more than just empirical adequacy. They contend that accepting a scientific theory involves committing to the truth of its theoretical claims, which serve as descriptions of reality underlying observable events.1

A central argument supporting this view is that realism provides the best explanation for the success of science. Realists argue that if scientific theories were not at least approximately true, the systematic success of these theories—such as their ability to predict experimental outcomes with extraordinary accuracy—would be a "miracle" or a coincidence of cosmic proportions. Consequently, realists reject the instrumentalist notion that theories are merely useful tools or "instruments" for prediction, asserting instead that theoretical terms, such as those referring to subatomic particles or chemical structures, should be taken as genuine references to real entities.123