How do prelinguistic infants show that some thinking can occur without language?
In the context of the philosophy of language, the existence of thought without language is supported by the observation that prelinguistic infants and higher primates are capable of solving complex problems, such as those requiring spatial memory.1
This capacity indicates that thinking can occur through nonlinguistic systems of representation—essentially internal "maps" or "models" of the world. Developmental research, such as that conducted by Jean Piaget, further illustrates this through the sensorimotor stage of infancy. During this period, infants demonstrate increasing intentionality and cognitive development by:1
- Goal-oriented behavior: Coordinating actions to attain external goals, such as knocking down a pillow to retrieve a hidden toy.2
- Trial-and-error experimentation: Inventing new sensorimotor schemes, such as using a tool to reach an object.2
- Object permanence: Developing the ability to treat objects as permanent entities that continue to exist even when out of sight, and eventually inferring the location of hidden objects.2
These behaviors suggest that infants possess a primitive form of mental representation used to solve problems before they acquire the symbolic tools of language.21