How do international institutions such as NATO and the United Nations affect the behavior of states?

In the context of neoinstitutionalism within the social sciences, the influence of international institutions like NATO and the United Nations on state behavior is a subject of significant debate between competing theoretical schools.

Neoliberal institutionalists argue that institutions matter beyond merely reflecting power structures. They contend that interaction with these organizations can modify state behavior by fostering cooperation, reducing the potential for long-term conflict, and encouraging states to adjust their policies to account for the needs of other members. For example, potential members often undergo rigorous internal reforms to qualify for NATO membership, demonstrating how institutional requirements can actively shape domestic and foreign policy.1

Conversely, neorealists argue that international institutions primarily mirror the existing power structure of the international system. From this perspective, institutions are constrained by the interests of dominant powers, and their ability to influence state behavior is limited by the underlying distribution of power. When the international structure changes, institutions must adapt or risk dissolution.1

Ultimately, these organizations serve as forums for bargaining, dispute settlement, and the legitimation of foreign policy, providing a framework through which states can pursue common objectives.21