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How do first-order desires differ from second-order desires in Harry Frankfurt's theory?
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Free will and moral responsibility
Immanuel Kant, print published in London, 1812.
In Harry Frankfurt’s hierarchical theory of the will, the distinction between first-order and second-order desires is central to his account of free will and autonomy.12
- First-order desires: These are basic desires to perform a specific action or obtain a certain object, such as a drug addict’s desire to consume a drug.12
- Second-order desires: These are desires directed toward one's own first-order desires. A person has a second-order desire when they reflectively endorse or reject a first-order desire—for example, wanting to have (or not have) the desire to take a drug.12
Frankfurt argues that having free will is a matter of identifying with one’s desires. An agent is free when their first-order desire is effective (it moves them to act) and they possess a second-order desire that this specific first-order desire be the one that moves them. If an agent acts on a first-order desire that they do not reflectively endorse—such as an addict who wants to quit but is compelled by their addiction—they lack the identification necessary for free agency.12