How do expressivism and projectivism explain moral judgments?

Expressivism and projectivism are antirealist metaethical views that reject the idea that moral judgments are statements of objective fact about the world. Instead, they explain moral discourse as a reflection of human attitudes.12

• Expressivism: This view holds that moral judgments do not describe facts but serve to express the speaker's feelings or attitudes, such as approval or disapproval. For example, stating that an action is "wrong" is not a factual claim but a way of expressing abhorrence toward that behavior or discouraging others from performing it.123

• Projectivism: Often associated with thinkers like Simon Blackburn, projectivism suggests that moral judgments are "projections" of our internal attitudes onto the world. We treat these attitudes as if they correspond to objective facts to facilitate serious, reflective social discourse and behavioral coordination.2

While these theories deny that morality exists as a realm of nonnatural facts, many proponents—such as those advocating "quasi-realism"—argue that we should continue to treat moral propositions as true or false to maintain the social and practical benefits of moral reasoning.12