How did submarines, mines, and torpedoes challenge Alfred Thayer Mahan’s ideas about sea power?

Alfred Thayer Mahan’s theories on sea power were fundamentally rooted in the historical experience of navies powered by sail, which emphasized the decisive role of concentrated battle fleets in achieving command of the sea. His doctrine focused on the battleship as the primary instrument of national supremacy.12

The emergence of submarines, mines, and torpedoes challenged Mahan’s framework in several critical ways:

• Technological Obsolescence: Mahan’s work underplayed the impact of these new technologies, which introduced unprecedented threats to the surface ships that formed the core of his strategic vision.1
• Guerrilla Warfare at Sea: Unlike the concentrated fleet actions Mahan advocated, submarine warfare functioned as a form of "guerrilla war at sea." Submarines relied on stealth, surprise, and dispersion rather than the concentration of force, making them effective tools for sea denial rather than sea control.3
• Vulnerability of Capital Ships: These weapons allowed smaller, less expensive craft to threaten or sink massive, costly battleships, complicating the traditional reliance on a dominant battle fleet to secure maritime commerce.431

While Mahan’s theories remained influential, these developments forced a shift toward more complex strategies that accounted for the persistent, asymmetric threats posed by underwater weapons.31