How did mines, torpedoes, and submarines challenge older theories of sea power?

The emergence of mines, torpedoes, and submarines fundamentally challenged traditional theories of sea power, which were largely rooted in the experience of sail-powered navies and the dominance of the surface fleet.1

Prominent naval theorists like Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that a dominant naval power could command the seas through a concentrated battle fleet. However, this doctrine struggled to account for the new, unprecedented threats posed by these underwater technologies. Specifically:1

• Asymmetric Threat: Unlike the traditional "ships of the line" that sought decisive surface engagements, submarines operated as "solo performers" relying on stealth, surprise, and concealment. Their tactics—akin to guerrilla warfare—focused on sea denial rather than sea control, eroding enemy resources and morale from beneath the surface.2
• Obsolescence of Traditional Frameworks: While theorists like Julian Corbett recognized the submarine's role against capital ships, they often underestimated how these vessels would evolve into the primary threat to commerce and other warships.2
• Technological Disruption: These weapons forced navies to shift focus toward antisubmarine warfare, including the use of destroyers and convoys, fundamentally altering the tactical landscape of maritime supremacy.23