How did metaphysics regain importance within analytic philosophy after the 1960s?

After the 1960s, metaphysics experienced a significant revival within analytic philosophy, overcoming the anti-metaphysical dominance of logical positivism that had characterized the mid-20th century. This recovery was driven by several key developments:1

• Ontological Commitment: W.V.O. Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment provided a rigorous, principled method for determining what entities a theory must accept as real. By extending Russell’s ideas on logic, Quine’s approach allowed philosophers to clarify their metaphysical commitments, leading to renewed debates on the existence of universals, events, and possible objects.1
• Modal Logic and Essentialism: The development of modal logic and possible-world semantics provided the tools to analyze necessity and possibility. Saul Kripke was central to this shift; his work, particularly Naming and Necessity (1980), challenged the conventional Kantian view that all a priori propositions are necessary. Kripke revived essentialism, arguing that objects possess essential properties, and demonstrated that some necessary truths are knowable only a posteriori (e.g., "Water is H₂O").123
• Broadening Scope: By the 1980s, traditional metaphysical topics—including the existence of God, free will, and personal identity—returned to the center of analytic debate, with various traditional schools of thought finding new representation within the movement.1