How did logical empiricism change the goals of logical positivism?

Logical positivism did not simply disappear; rather, it evolved into the more moderate movement of logical empiricism as its proponents encountered significant difficulties in defining a strict criterion of meaningfulness.1

While early logical positivism sought to dismiss traditional philosophical questions as meaningless by applying a rigid verifiability principle, these attempts often proved either too restrictive—excluding valid scientific hypotheses—or too lax, inadvertently allowing metaphysical pronouncements to appear meaningful.1

As the movement transitioned into logical empiricism, its goals shifted in the following ways:

• Increased Flexibility: The requirement that theories be empirically testable became more flexible and tolerant, moving away from the strict, often problematic criteria of the earlier period.2
• Focus on Scientific Method: Logical empiricists prioritized understanding the distinctive virtues of the natural sciences. They aimed to use the tools of mathematical logic to develop a thorough theory of scientific method, viewing this as a central task for philosophy that could resolve debates and clear up conceptual confusions in various fields of inquiry.1
• Modernization: The movement moved away from the older Comte-Mach tradition, which had maintained a negative attitude toward atomic theory and theoretical entities, aligning itself instead with the spirit of modern science.2