How did Ludwig Wittgenstein use the idea of language-games to discuss meaning?

In his later philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein moved away from the view that language functions as a rigid system of abstract rules, as presented in his earlier work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Instead, he argued that meaning is derived from the practical, human activities he termed "language-games."1

Wittgenstein compared the meaning of a word to the power of a piece in a game of chess; just as a piece’s function is defined by its role within the game, a word’s meaning is animated by its use in specific human contexts, such as giving directions or calling for tools. He emphasized that language is not governed by a single, definitive set of rules. Instead, words often share only a "family resemblance," a complex network of overlapping similarities rather than a common essence.1

Ultimately, Wittgenstein suggested that knowing the meaning of a word is not about grasping a hidden concept or rule, but about sharing the linguistic dispositions of a community. Because these practices are open-ended and can evolve, meaning is not fixed; it is generated by usage within the public, checkable framework of human interaction.1