How did Ludwig Wittgenstein describe logical truths as true in all possible worlds?

In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein argued that logical truths are tautologies, meaning they are true by definition rather than by representing features of an independently existing reality.12

Wittgenstein did not describe these truths as being true in "all possible worlds" in the sense of empirical discovery; rather, he maintained that logic is trivial and says nothing about the world. Because tautologies are true by definition and follow from the use of language and logical connectives, they are necessarily true in every possible configuration of truth-values. Consequently, he argued that all necessary propositions are tautologies and, in a sense, say the same thing: nothing at all.12

This approach contrasts with his later work, such as On Certainty, where he shifted his focus from the formal structure of language to the role of "acting" within a community, suggesting that certainty is presupposed in our social activities rather than being a property of logical propositions alone.3