How did Hilary Putnam describe the truth defended by metaphysical realism?

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Hilary Putnam characterized the truth defended by metaphysical realism as radically nonepistemic.1

According to Putnam, the metaphysical realist maintains that even an ideal scientific theory—one that satisfies every methodological and aesthetic requirement and is judged true by the best operational criteria—could still be false in reality. This conception of truth is intended to be entirely independent of human knowledge or belief, potentially outstripping not only what scientists currently believe but also what they would believe under perfectly rational and evidentially ideal conditions.12

Putnam rejected this view, arguing that it relies on an untenable picture of word-world correspondence and that the possibility of an ideal theory being false is ultimately meaningless. In opposition, he defended an "internal" realism, which connects truth more closely to ideal rational acceptability.12