How did Gitlow v. New York use the dangerous tendency test to uphold a conviction?

In Gitlow v. New York (1925), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Benjamin Gitlow by rejecting the "clear and present danger" test in favor of the "dangerous tendency" test.1

While the clear and present danger standard—established in Schenck v. U.S.—required evidence of an imminent threat to public safety, the dangerous tendency test allowed the government to suppress speech that merely had the potential to lead to future harm. The Court reasoned that a state "cannot reasonably be required to defer the adoption of measures for its own peace and safety until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances." Consequently, the state was permitted to suppress such "threatened danger in its incipiency," even if the defendant's publication did not create an immediate or imminent risk of the government's destruction.12

Although this ruling upheld Gitlow's conviction, it is historically significant for establishing that the First Amendment protections of free speech apply to state governments through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1