How did Frege and Bertrand Russell view logical truths differently from algebraic logicians?

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The distinction between the views of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell and those of algebraic logicians—such as George Boole, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Ernst Schröder—centers on their differing conceptions of logic as either a language or a calculus.1

  • Logic as Language: Frege and Russell viewed logic as a lingua universalis, or a universal medium of communication. In this framework, they conceived of logical truths as the most general truths about the world. Because this system serves as a universal language, its semantics cannot be discussed from within the logic itself without resulting in triviality or nonsense; consequently, only the formal or syntactic features of the logic can be analyzed.1
  • Logic as Calculus: In contrast, the algebraic tradition treated logic primarily as a calculus ratiocinator, or a tool for drawing inferences. From this perspective, logic is a system that can be theorized about, discussed, and modified. Algebraically oriented logicians dealt with all possible universes of discourse, rather than viewing logical truths as universal truths about a single world.1

While Frege and Russell sought to derive mathematics from basic logical laws, their approach remained distinct from the algebraic tradition's focus on manipulating symbols to facilitate reasoning.23