How did Bertrand Russell challenge Berkeley’s argument that to be is to be perceived?

Bertrand Russell challenged George Berkeley’s subjective idealism—the doctrine that esse est percipi ("to be is to be perceived")—by utilizing analytic philosophy to distinguish between what can be known by acquaintance and what is known by description.12

While Berkeley argued that physical objects are merely collections of sense-data dependent on a perceiving mind, Russell sought to ground philosophy in a more scientific, realistic framework. Russell observed that while one can doubt the existence of a physical object (like a desk), one cannot doubt the existence of one's current sense-data or visual impressions.312

Rather than concluding that reality is purely mental, Russell used symbolic logic and his theory of descriptions to argue that physical objects could be understood as "logical constructions" built out of these sense-data. By analyzing language, Russell aimed to show that we do not need to assume the world is composed of minds or spirits to account for our experiences, thereby rejecting the necessity of Berkeley’s immaterialism.124