How can the threat of nuclear retaliation discourage an attack?

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The threat of nuclear retaliation discourages an attack through the strategy of deterrence, which aims to prevent aggression by making the potential costs of an attack appear unacceptably high to an adversary.12

This strategy relies on two fundamental conditions:
* Credibility: A state must possess a secure second strike capability—the ability to survive a surprise attack and retaliate with overwhelming force.13
* Perception: An aggressor must believe that the target state has the will to retaliate, even if doing so invites further destruction.1

This logic is central to the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD), which posits that if both sides maintain sufficient nuclear forces to annihilate one another, a nuclear exchange becomes suicidal for both parties. By creating a "hostage" relationship where neither side can gain an advantage, nuclear powers seek to maintain a stable, albeit tense, peace. However, this strategy is not absolute; history shows that nuclear possession has not always deterred conventional conflicts, as seen in the Falkland Islands War and the Vietnam War.452