Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., case in which the U.S. Supreme Court on January 11, 1977, ruled (5–3) that an Illinois city’s denial of a rezoning request for a development company—which planned to construct housing aimed at racially diverse low- and moderate-income owners—was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause, because racially discriminatory intent or purpose had not been the motivating factor in the city’s decision.

In 1971 Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation (MHDC) applied to the village of Arlington Heights, Illinois, to have a parcel of land rezoned from single-family to multiple-family housing in order to build townhouses that would be affordable for low- and moderate-income residents. Since MHDC was to receive federal assistance, the project required an “affirmative marketing plan” to encourage racial integration. The city held a series of public meetings, at which time opponents of the proposed development noted that the area in question had always been zoned for single-family housing and that rezoning could result in lowered property values. In addition, some raised concerns about the “social issues” involved with the project. The rezoning request was subsequently denied.

In 1972 MHDC and several other parties filed suit. A federal district court ruled in favour of Arlington Heights, finding that the city’s decision resulted not from discrimination but from “a desire to protect property values and the integrity of the Village’s zoning plan.” A court of appeals, however, reversed. Although it agreed with the lower court’s assessment concerning the city’s motivation, it held that the denial had “racial discriminatory effects” and could be permitted only “if it served compelling interests.” The appellate court did not feel that Arlington Heights’s reasons rose to that level, and the rezoning denial was thus a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, which provides that “no state shall…deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

On October 13, 1976, the case was argued before the U.S. Supreme Court. Previously, in Washington v. Davis (1976), the court had decided that an official action would not be found unconstitutional only because a racially disproportionate impact resulted. Instead, the court required “proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose” in order to qualify as an equal protection clause violation.

However, the Supreme Court held that an unequal impact on any group may provide a starting point in determining motivation. The court noted that a clear pattern of disproportionate impact, which can be explained only by discriminatory intent, can become apparent even if a statute is neutral in its language. The court added that the impact of an official action may be so clearly discriminatory as to allow no other explanation than that it was adopted for discriminatory, and therefore unconstitutional, purposes. That inquiry into the motivating factor, the court maintained, includes the circumstantial and direct evidence of the intent or purpose of the action and can include a “clear pattern unexplainable on grounds other than race”; historical background, especially if it reveals official actions taken for invidious purposes; departures from the normal procedural sequence; and legislative or administrative history, such as contemporary statements made by members of the decision-making body and meeting minutes or reports.

After considering those factors, the court held that MHDC had failed to carry its burden of proving that Arlington Heights’s decision was motivated by discriminatory intent. According to the court, there were acceptable reasons for denying MHDC’s zoning request. Thus, the appellate court’s decision was reversed. (Only eight justices reviewed the case; John Paul Stevens was not part of the consideration or decision.)