Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association

Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association, case in which the U.S. Supreme Court on March 21, 1989, ruled (7–2) that an alcohol- and drug-testing program for railroad employees in safety-sensitive positions did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

After a number of railroad accidents in which alcohol or drugs were involved, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) in 1985 adopted regulations that subjected employees who were involved in safety-sensitive jobs to blood and urine tests either for “reasonable cause” or after they were participants in a variety of specified major train accidents that involved deaths or damages of more than $50,000 to railway property. Employees who refused to submit to testing were disqualified for “covered service” for nine months but were entitled to hearings about their refusals to cooperate.

A number of labour organizations, including the Railway Labor Executives’ Association, filed suit. James Horace Burnley, the U.S. secretary of transportation, was initially a respondent; when he left the post in 1989, his successor, Samuel K. Skinner, was named in the suit. A federal district court subsequently upheld the program’s constitutionality, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the program violated the Fourth Amendment, which forbids unreasonable searches and seizure. The court objected to testing for drugs and alcohol regardless of whether there was suspicion that employees engaged in their use.

The case was argued before the U.S. Supreme Court on November 2, 1988. At the outset of its opinion, the court acknowledged that the disputed program constituted a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, insofar as the testing of railway employees was compelled as a result of a governmental initiative. Therefore, the court was of the opinion that it was necessary to address the question of “reasonableness” in conducting the search. In other words, the court sought to review the balance between the intrusiveness of any drug test against the legitimate governmental interest of promoting safety. In so doing, the court relied on the concept of “special needs” outside normal law-enforcement channels in finding that the testing program was designed to be used in situations wherein the probable cause and warrant requirements simply were not practicable. The court further explained that though the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement was designed to protect individuals’ expectations of privacy, the regulations required testing only under clearly defined circumstances.

The Supreme Court reasoned that requiring railway officials to obtain warrants would have done little to advance the government’s compelling interest in ensuring railway safety. In justifying its rationale, the court pointed out that the employees knew not only that they were working in a highly regulated industry but also that the regulations were an effective means of deterring those who worked in safety-sensitive positions from using drugs or alcohol. The court decided that requiring the government, through the railway’s managers, to rely on individualized suspicion that employees engaged in drug or alcohol use would seriously impede them in carrying out their duty to obtain important information. The court thus concluded that the government’s compelling need to test employees under the circumstances described in the regulations outweighed any justifiable expectations of privacy that crews might have had to avoid testing. The decision of the Ninth Circuit was reversed.