golden parachute, a provision in an employment contract that grants lucrative severance benefits to an executive if control of the company changes hands, as by a merger. Most definitions offered by legal authorities stress three elements: (1) a lucrative or attractive severance package, (2) available to a few selected senior executives, (3) in a change-of-control situation for the company. Some also define it as compensation to a chief executive officer or other C-level executive for losing his or her job. Others do not so restrict its availability to those who actually lose their jobs, but extend it as well to those who lose job status in the event of a change in control.
In common usage, the term golden parachute refers to large severance payments made when a change of control results in job termination. However, for tax purposes, the crucial element is change in corporate control, and the payment need not be to compensate for termination but could be any type of compensation. It is also useful to distinguish a golden parachute from a normal severance payment. Usually, an employee dismissed for cause does not receive a severance payment, and the same is true when that employee leaves voluntarily. However, a C-level executive who is fired for cause or simply resigns may receive a golden parachute, depending on the terms of the employment contract.
As a way to further distinguish golden parachutes from severance payments, the amount of a severance payment is based on years of service to the company, while a golden parachute is based on the individual negotiation between the executive and the company. Even a CEO who serves for a short time period may wind up with a substantial golden parachute.
Golden parachutes are usually included in the contracts for C-level executives (chief executive officer, chief operating officer, chief financial officer, and chief legal officer), but they sometimes appear in the contracts for executive vice presidents and other top officers as well. After the merger between Coors and Molson, 11 top executives at Coors resigned, since they had change-of-control payment provisions in their contracts. None of the Molson top executives resigned, though, as they were not covered by such provisions.
The pay components of a golden parachute may vary widely. It may include not only a cash payout, along with restricted stock or stock options, but also an annual pension, a departure bonus, medical benefits, and administrative and secretarial support. It may also include other imaginative perks, including payment of charitable donations in the executiveâs name or use of an executive jet.
In their golden parachutes, CEOs typically receive two or three times the value of the base salary and bonus, as well as benefits, stock options, and pension payments. Presidents, COOs, CFOs, and other C-level executives typically receive one to two times the base salary, plus bonus, benefits, stock options, and pensions.
Some CEOs negotiated golden parachutes that allowed stock options to vest immediately, and thereafter payouts skyrocketed, according to one compensation expert. Some golden parachutes had a platinum lining. For instance, Michael Ovitz received a severance payment exceeding $100 million from Disney; Philip Purcell had an exit package of $114 million after his dismissal as CEO of Morgan Stanley; and Jim Kilts, CEO of Gillette, received a golden parachute of $165 million after Procter & Gamble acquired his company. Those amounts raise questions of distributive justice, especially since a merger may trigger uncompensated layoffs of lower-level employees.
When a CEO receives a huge golden parachute after the companyâs stock value has plummeted, that offends shareholders and critics the most and raises questions of deservedness. Henry McKinnell of Pfizer, for instance, was granted a pension package of $83 million before his resignation and after the company had lost 46% of its stock value during his term of office.
The original and key purpose of the golden parachute, dating back to the 1970s and 1980s, was to protect CEOs and other top officers in the event of takeovers that might lead to their ouster. They would then enjoy security in a market where other CEO positions might not be readily available and would be more willing to take the job initially. Second, a golden parachute might better align the interests of CEOs with those of shareholders. Given the security that golden parachutes provide to CEOs and the compensation for future lost expected earnings, they would have no self-interest in resisting a merger or takeover that might enhance the value of shares, at least on a short-term basis. Top management would not have the incentive to interfere with the market for corporate control that includes potential takeover bids. In fact, some CEOs might view the sale of a company as a crowning event in their careers, and with golden parachutes the CEOs would benefit both economically and from any positive publicity attending the sale of the company.
Another purpose of golden parachutes might be to deter an unwanted or hostile takeover, since the raider then absorbs the burden of making substantial payouts to the CEO and other senior executives. In that sense, golden parachutes might serve as poison pills and defenses against takeovers. In fact, a company might institute golden parachutes as events triggered by a takeover offer. Furthermore, golden parachutes might serve as recruitment and retention incentives, attracting senior executives to a firm where they might expect a substantial payout some years down the road and causing them to stick with a firm until that eventuality. When other companies have adopted golden parachutes, defenders argue that an employer must adopt generous packages to keep pace and remain competitive.
