economic openness

economic openness, in political economy, the degree to which nondomestic transactions (imports and exports) take place and affect the size and growth of a national economy. The degree of openness is measured by the actual size of registered imports and exports within a national economy, also known as the Impex rate. This measure is presently used by most political economists in empirically analyzing the impact and consequences of trading on the social and economic situation of a country.

The term economic openness first appeared in the literature of comparative political economy in the early 1980s. However, as a concept, economic openness has a much longer history, particularly in the field of international economics. Actually, the history of studying the causes and effects of the open economy dates back as far as the 18th century and figures prominently in the work of classical economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo. These classical economists were concerned about the consequences of international trading on the domestic economy as well as the positive and negative effects of free trade. Originally, the focus of analysis was on commodity exchange and exchange rates; at present, the focus is more on the ramifications of economic openness on domestic economic systems per se.

Openness in economies has existed since the heydays of economic liberalism and industrial development in the second half of the 19th century. For instance, the British-born economic historian Angus Maddison reported in 1995 that the growth in volume of world trade was 3.4 percent (average) between 1870 and 1913 and 3.7 percent from 1973 to 1992. During the same time span, however, prices (constant dollars of 1990) went up 12 times. In addition, the number of countries involved grew dramatically across the world during that period. Labour costs were falling simultaneously, so the locus of industry shifted and economic liberalism (or free trade) prevailed, and this implied that national economic growth became more dependent in the movements on the world market. Conversely, but simultaneously, democratization took place, albeit in various waves over time, which changed the role of the state in most countries. The results of these changes included the emergence of the welfare state as well as the idea of welfare economics. This interaction has been at the core of political economists’ researching the effects of economic openness. Some authors feared the crowding-out effect of public expenditures as harmful to the national economy and its competitive nature. Others argued that welfare economics is more important than the welfare state. In this view, the beneficial effects of international trade and related domestic activities would prevail and produce welfare in terms of income redistribution, affluence in terms of a higher level of per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and welfare in general.

The table shows some comparative indicators with regard to openness and socioeconomic developments. It is adapted from Maddison’s Monitoring the World Economy 1820–1992 (1995). The figures in the table have been calculated as follows: Impex="import" + export/GDP as a percentage; Economic Growth="annual" change in percentage; Inequality="income" share of top 20 percent of population.

The levels are, with exceptions, generally similar with respect to economic openness (Impex). Hence, one would expect higher levels of economic growth almost everywhere and a certain reduction of inequalities across most regions. This is, however, not the case. International trade does indeed link a country with the world economy. However, it does not reduce its level of affluence and does not always produce more economic growth and income inequality. The literature accounts for this weak relationship by pointing to demographic and geographic factors on the one hand and to political factors on the other hand.

The size of a country and its population are negatively correlated with the extent of economic openness. Population growth, which is often high or higher in less-developed parts of the world, tends to eat higher outputs. Larger economies tend to produce more for internal markets (e.g., the United States has an Impex of 25.6; Russia, 44.4; Argentina, 23.3; and Japan, 21.0). In the past, this led to forms of autarchy by means of protection. Since the late 20th century, however, this tendency has been countered by the globalization of economic relations, the dissolution of the communist world, and the operation of institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Hence, most if not all countries are by now more or less integrated into the world economy, although the extent varies according to certain political circumstances:

The analysis of the relationship between democracy and economic development is a long-standing one. Democratic conditions and the “rule of law” would be beneficial for domestic outputs, would spill over into trade advantages, and thus would eventually produce more affluence and prosperity. Although this appears a tenable proposition, comparative analysis shows that this relationship is not a direct one. Intervening variables affect the relationship between system characteristics (e.g., type and quality of the democratic polity) and openness of the economy. For instance, organized interests (such as business and labour), on the one hand, and political parties and types of government, on the other hand, are mentioned. In other words, the institutional design of the polity and the behaviour of political actors are considered to affect economic development and its relation to the world economy. The more open an economy is, the more vital the role of politics and institutions will be.

There has been much discussion about the relationship of an open economy to political vitality. Some scholars argue that the emergence and embeddedness of interest groups has negatively affected economic growth and competitiveness (i.e., institutional sclerosis). Conversely, other scholars argue that the more a country’s economy depends on international trade, the stronger is the need for institutions that promote cooperation between organized interests and the state (i.e., corporatism). All these scholars conceive of political institutions as crucial for economic development and, consequently, for coping with economic openness. Many of them also argue that party government produces volatile conditions because changes in the ruling party lead to changes of policy.

Economic openness has been important for understanding a country’s economic development. At present the relationship between the domestic economy (level and growth of outputs) and international trade (exchange patterns on the world market) is omnipresent and affects the affluence and prosperity of a society (for income generation and its redistribution). Economic openness, albeit influenced by factors like geographic variables (population size and resources), appears to contribute to the wealth of a nation. The various literature on political economy suggests that the features of a political system (democratic or not), its institutional design, and the role of organized interests and political parties are important for understanding how economic openness affects a country’s performance for economic viability and social consequences.

John K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society (1962); Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (1989); A.G. Kenwood and A.L. Lougheed, The Growth of the International Economy 1820–1960 (1971); Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth of Nations (1971); Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, Comparative Political Economy: A Developmental Approach, 2nd ed. (1997); Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy 1820–1992 (1995); Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (1982).