Why is a team’s intention to perform a symphony not simply a collection of individual intentions?

According to the American philosopher John Searle, a team’s intention to perform a symphony is not simply a collection of individual intentions because collective intentions—or "we-intentions"—are not reducible to the sum of individual "I-intentions."1

While we-intentions necessarily entail individual intentions (as a person must intend to do their part to participate in a collective act), they represent a distinct form of cooperative behavior. For example, the intention to perform a symphony is not equivalent to the mere sum of individual intentions to play specific notes on specific instruments. Searle argues that there is no separate entity beyond the individuals involved that holds these intentions; rather, individuals hold we-intentions that create objective social reality through the framework of "X counts as Y in context C." By adopting these collective intentions, individuals transform social interactions into institutional facts, such as games, money, or musical performances.1