Why did Henri Bergson criticize the scientific treatment of psychological experiences?

Henri Bergson criticized the scientific treatment of psychological experiences because he believed that science fundamentally falsifies the nature of human consciousness by attempting to quantify and measure it.1

Bergson argued that psychological facts are qualitatively unique and cannot be reduced to the mathematical or spatial terms used in physics. He specifically challenged the practice of treating duration—the lived, flowing experience of time—as if it were a series of discrete, measurable units on a clock. By trying to assign numbers to sensations, such as in Fechner’s Law, psychologists mistakenly confounded quality with quantity and succession with simultaneity.1

For Bergson, the scientific approach is an interpretation designed for practical activity rather than a true apprehension of reality. He maintained that because science eliminates duration to achieve its results, it fails to capture the free-moving, creative nature of the inner self, ultimately leading to baseless arguments for determinism.21