How does John Searle distinguish collective intentions from individual intentions?

American philosopher John Searle distinguishes between collective intentions ("we-intentions") and individual intentions ("I-intentions") by emphasizing that while the former are held only by individuals, they are not reducible to the sum of the latter.1

Searle argues that a collective intention, such as "Let’s push the log at the count of three," entails the existence of individual intentions because a person cannot intend for a group to act without also intending to perform their own part. However, he maintains that a we-intention is not merely a collection of I-intentions. For instance, the collective intention to perform a symphony is not equivalent to the sum of individual intentions to play specific notes on specific instruments.1

Because there is no distinct collective entity that acts as a bearer of these intentions, Searle concludes that we-intentions are fundamentally different from, and irreducible to, the individual intentions that support them. These collective intentions are essential to his account of how objective social reality and social institutions are created.1