How did William of Ockham’s nominalism differ from Plato’s theory of Forms?

William of Ockham’s nominalism fundamentally differs from Plato’s theory of Forms by rejecting the existence of universal entities.12

Plato’s realism asserts that universals—such as "Beauty" or "Justice"—are abstract, objective realities that exist independently of both mental activity and the particular objects that instantiate them. In this view, these Forms possess a "pure being" that transcends space and time.13

In contrast, William of Ockham insisted that only individual, particular things exist in the nonlinguistic world. He argued that universals are not real, independent entities but are merely general words or concepts used to categorize particulars based on their similarities. For Ockham, the use of a general term does not imply the existence of a corresponding universal thing. This perspective was rooted in his commitment to the absolute freedom of God, arguing that God creates individual things directly without relying on preconceived, universal models or essences. Consequently, Ockham’s nominalism serves as a rejection of the metaphysical necessity of Platonic realism for understanding general language and thought.142