How did John Searle’s view of mental states address the mind-body problem?

John Searle addresses the mind-body problem by arguing that it is fundamentally misconceived, rooted in an outmoded dichotomy between traditional concepts of mind and matter.12

Rather than viewing the mind and body as separate substances—as René Descartes famously proposed—Searle maintains that mental states are inherently biological phenomena. He compares consciousness to other biological processes, such as digestion, asserting that it is an intrinsic feature of complex biological systems.12

Key aspects of his view include:
* Biological Naturalism: Because mental states are biological, they are not separate from the physical world; they can both cause and be caused by physical changes in the body.1
* Rejection of Reductionism: While mental states are biological, Searle does not believe they are "reducible" to physical states in a way that would allow mental talk to be eliminated in favor of purely physical descriptions.1
* Essentiality: Reference to mental states remains essential for any adequate explanation of human behavior.1

By framing consciousness as a biological process, Searle seeks to resolve the tension between subjective experience and the physical vocabulary of science.2