How did Immanuel Kant criticize Leibnizian rationalism during the 1760s?
During the 1760s, Immanuel Kant moved away from Leibnizian rationalism by challenging both its methodology and its core metaphysical doctrines. Influenced by his study of Isaac Newton and the moral philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Kant argued that philosophy should not attempt to model itself on mathematics.1
Methodological Critique
In his 1764 work, An Inquiry into the Distinctness of the Fundamental Principles of Natural Theology and Morals, Kant contended that while mathematics proceeds from arbitrary definitions to construct demonstrated truths, philosophy must begin with concepts that are already given. He argued that philosophy cannot proceed synthetically like mathematics; instead, it must focus on analysis and clarification.1
Critique of Leading Ideas
Kant also attacked specific Leibnizian concepts:
* Causality: He argued that physical opposition cannot be reduced to logical contradiction, rejecting the reduction of causality to a relation of antecedent and consequent.1
* Ontological Argument: He criticized the ontological argument for the existence of God, asserting that existence is not a predicate of attribution.1
* Space: Siding with Newton, he rejected the Leibnizian view that space is merely an order of co-existences.1